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Chris Dixon

• Designing products for single and multiplayer modes 12 June, 2010, 9:42 am
  The first million people who bought VCRs bought them before there were any movies available to watch on them. They just wanted to “time shift” TV shows – what we use DVRs for today. Once there were millions of VCR owners it became worthwhile for Hollywood to start selling and renting movies to watch on them. Eventually watching rented movies became the dominant use of VCRs, and time shifting a relatively niche use. Thus, a product that eventually had very strong network effects* got its initial traction from a “standalone use” – where no other VCR owners or complementary products needed to exist. I was talking to my friend Zach Klein recently who referred to products as having single player and multiplayer modes. I like Zach’s terminology because: 1) it is borrowed from video games where a lot of thought has gone into making these modes compelling in distinct ways, 2) the word “mode” reminds us that people can switch from moment to moment – that even when a product is primarily social or networked and has reached critical mass it might still be useful to offer a single player mode. Many products that we think of as strictly multiplayer also have single player modes. In many cases this single player mode helped adoption in the early stages when the network effects were not yet strong. For example, you could use Flickr just to store photos privately if you wanted to. I thought of Foursquare as strictly multiplayer until my Hunch cofounder Tom Pinckney told me he uses it solely to keep track of restaurants he’s gone to so he’ll remember which ones to go back to. For some products it’s really hard to imagine single player modes. This is true of pure communication products like Skype and perhaps also social networks like Facebook (although apps like games seem to have provided single player modes for Facebook). – * Products with so-called networks effects get more valuable when more people use them.  Famous examples are telephones and social networks.  Network effects can be your friend or your enemy depending on whether your product has reached critical mass.  Getting to critical mass in network effect markets is sometimes called overcoming the “chicken and egg problem.”  More here.
• Inside versus outside financings: the nightclub effect 8 June, 2010, 4:01 pm
  At some point in the life of a venture-backed startup there typically arises a choice between doing an inside round, where the existing investors lead the new financing, or an outside round, where new investors lead the new financing. At this point interesting game-theoretic dynamics arise among management, existing investors, and prospective new investors. If the company made the mistake of including big VCs in their seed round, they’ll face this situation raising their Series A.  If the company was smart and only included true seed investors in their initial round, they won’t face this issue until their Series B. Here’s a typical situation. Say the startup raised a Series A at a $15M post-money valuation and is doing pretty well. The CEO offers the existing VCs the option of leading an inside round but the insiders are lukewarm and suggest the CEO go out to test the financing market.  The CEO does so and gets offers from top-tier VCs to invest at a significant step up, say, $30M pre. The insiders who previously didn’t want to do an inside round are suddenly really excited about the company because they see that other VCs are really excited about the company. This is what I call the nightclub effect*. You think your date isn’t that attractive until you bring him/her to a nightclub and everyone in the club hits on him/her. Consequently, you now think your date is really attractive. Now the inside investors have 3 choices:  1) Lead the financing themselves. This makes the CEO look like a jerk that used the outsiders as stalking horses. It might also prevent the company from getting a helpful, new VC involved. 2) Do pro-rata (normally defined as: X% of round where X is the % ownership prior to round).  This is theoretically the best choice, although often in real life the math doesn’t work since a top-tier new VC will demand owning 15-20% of the company which is often impossible without raising a far bigger round than the company needs. (When you see head-scratchingly large Series B rounds, this is often the cause). 3) Do less than pro-rata. VCs hate this because they view pro-rata as an option they paid for and especially when the company is “hot” they want to exercise that right. The only way to get them down in this case is for management to wage an all out war to force them to. This can get quite ugly. I’ve come to think that the best solution to this is to get the insiders to explicitly commit ahead of time to either leading the round or being willing to back down from their pro-rata rights for the right new investor. This lets the CEO go out and find new investors in good faith without using them as stalking horses and without wasting everyone’s time. * don’t miss @peretti’s response.
• Steve Jobs single-handedly restructured the mobile industry 6 June, 2010, 1:44 pm
  With the introduction of the iPhone, Steve Jobs achieved something that might be unique in the history of business: he single-handedly upended the power structure of a major industry.  In the US, before the iPhone, the carriers (Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile) had an ironclad grip on the rest of the value chain – particularly, handset makers and app makers. Ask anyone who ran or invested in a mobile app startup pre-iPhone (I invested in one myself). Since the carriers had all the power, getting any distribution (which usually meant getting on the handset “deck”) meant doing a business development deal with the carriers. Business development in this case meant finding the right people at those companies, sending them iPods, taking them to baseball games, and basically figuring out ways to convince them to work with you instead of the 5,000 other people sending them iPods and baseball tickets.  The basis of competition was salesmanship and capital, not innovation or quality. The carriers had so much power because consumers made their purchasing decisions by choosing a carrier first and a handset second. Post-iPhone, tens of millions of people started choosing handsets over carriers. People like me suffer through AT&T’s poor service and aggressive pricing because I love the iPhone so much. I’ve talked to a number of mobile app startups lately who say their former contacts at the carriers are shell shocked: no one is knocking on their doors anymore. I guess they have to buy their own iPods and baseball tickets now. Yes, Apple has rejected some apps for seemingly arbtrary or selfish reasons and imposed aggressive controls on developers. But the iPhone also paved the way for Android and a new wave of handset development. The people griping about Apple’s “closed system” are generally people who are new to the industry and didn’t realize how bad it was before.
• There are three New York Cities 4 June, 2010, 4:42 pm
  There are roughly three New Yorks. There is, first, the New York of the man or woman who was born here, who takes the city for granted and accepts its size and turbulence as natural and inevitable. Second, there is the New York of the commuter—the city that is devoured by locusts each day and spat out each night. Third, there is the New York of the person who was born somewhere else and came to New York in quest of something. Of these three trembling cities the greatest is the last—the city of final destination, the city that is a goal. It is this third city that accounts for New York’s high-strung disposition, its poetical deportment, its dedication to the arts, and its incomparable achievements. Commuters give the city its tidal restlessness; natives give it solidity and continuity; but the settlers give it passion. And whether it is a farmer arriving from Italy to set up a small grocery store in a slum, or a young girl arriving from a small town in Mississippi to escape the indignity of being observed by her neighbors, or a boy arriving from the Corn Belt with a manuscript in his suitcase and a pain in his heart, it makes no difference: each embraces New York with the intense excitement of first love, each absorbs New York with the fresh eyes of an adventurer, each generates heat and light to dwarf the Consolidated Edison Company. Here is New York, E. B. White, 1949
• Money managers should pay the same tax rates as everyone else 1 June, 2010, 9:50 am
  Steven Schwarzman is the CEO of the Blackstone Group, a multi-billion dollar money management firm. He is worth billions of dollars, and isn’t afraid to spend his money lavishly: He often spends $3,000 for a weekend of food for Mr. Schwarzman and his wife, including stone crabs that cost $400, or $40 per claw. Mr Schwarzman pays a lower tax rate than police officers, firefighters, soldiers, doctors, and teachers. This is the due to the fact that money managers’ “carry fees” are treated as capital gains instead of ordinary income. Last week the House passed a bill that would partly close this loophole. Sadly, with few exceptions, VC’s are lobbying against this bill, arguing it would hurt innovation, small businesses, and lots of other good stuff.  As one prominent VC recently said: [H]aving those higher taxes be levied against venture capital investments in small businesses strikes me as self-defeating when it is the single largest job growth area. The argument seems to be that this tax will hurt small businesses. The phrase “small business” is chosen deliberately by VC lobbyists: most people, when they hear it, think of hard working immigrants pursuing the American Dream. In reality, the only thing this bill will hurt are money managers. As Fred Wilson says: Changing the taxation of the managers will not reduce the amount of capital going to productive areas. The sources of the capital; wealthy families, endowments, pension funds, and the like, will still put the capital in the places where they will get the highest after tax return. And these sources of capital, if they are tax payers, will still get capital gains treatment on their investments in hedge funds, buyouts, and venture capital. And the fund managers will still have to compete with each other to get access to that capital and their incentives will still be to produce the highest returns they can produce, regardless of whether they are paying capital gains or ordinary income on their fees. As Fred also argues, removing this tax break will encourage more people to go into jobs that produce tangible goods: We have witnessed financial services (think asset management, hedge funds, buyout funds, private equity, and venture capital) grow as a percentage of GNP for the past thirty years. The best and brightest don’t go into engineering, science, manufacturing, general management, or entrepreneurship, they go to wall street where they will get paid more. And on top of that, we have been giving these jobs a tax break. That seems like bad policy. If we force hedge funds and the like to compete for talent on a more level playing field, then maybe we’ll see our best and brightest minds go to more productive activities than moving money around and taking a cut of the action. Fred is absolutely correct. For me, though, removing this loophole just comes down to basic fairness. A fireman who runs into burning buildings shouldn’t pay a higher tax rate than a financier sunbathing on a yacht eating $400 crabs.
• While Google fights on the edges, Amazon is attacking their core 22 May, 2010, 9:27 am
  Google is fighting battles on almost every front:  social networking, mobile operating systems, web browsers, office apps, and so on.  Much of this makes sense, inasmuch as it is strategic for them to dominate or commoditize each layer that stands between human beings and online ads.  But while they are doing this, they are leaving their core business vulnerable, particularly to Amazon. When legendary VC John Doerr quit Amazon’s board a few months ago, savvy industry observers like TechCrunch speculated that Google might begin directly competing with Amazon: [Google] competes with Amazon in a number of areas, particularly web services and big data. And down the road, Google may compete directly in other ways as well. Froogle was a flop, but don’t think Google doesn’t want a bigger chunk of ecommerce revenue from people who begin their product searches on their search engine.* In fact, Google and Amazon’s are already direct competitors in their core businesses. Like Amazon, Google makes the vast majority of its revenue from users who are looking to make an online purchase. Other query types – searches related to news, blog posts, funny videos, etc. – are mostly a loss leaders for Google. The key risk for Google is that they are heavily dependent on online purchasing being a two-stage process:  the user does a search on Google, and then clicks on an ad to buy something on another site. As long as the e-commerce world is sufficiently fragmented, users will prefer an intermediary like Google to help them find the right product or merchant. But as Amazon increasingly dominates the e-commerce market, this fragmentation could go away along with users’ need for an intermediary.** Moreover, Google’s algorithmic results for product searches are generally poor. (Try using Google to decide what dishwasher to buy). These poor results might actually lead to short term revenue increases since the sponsored links are superior to the unsponsored ones.  But long term if Google continues producing poor product search results and Amazon continues consolidating the e-commerce market, Google’s core business is at serious risk. — * Froogle (and Google Products) have been unsuccessful most likely because Google has had no incentive to make them better: they make plenty of money on these queries already on a CPC basis, and would likely make less if they moved to a CPA model. ** Most Amazon Prime customers probably already do skip Google and go directly to Amazon.  I know I do.
• Facebook is about to try to dominate display ads the way Google dominates text ads 15 May, 2010, 3:07 pm
  It is customary to divide online advertising into two categories: direct response and brand advertising. I prefer instead to divide it according to the mindset of users: whether or not they are actively looking to purchase something (i.e. they have purchasing intent).* When users are actively looking to purchase something, they typically go to search engines or e-commerce sites. Through advertising or direct sales, these sites harvest intent. Google and Amazon are the biggest financial beneficiaries of intent harvesting. When the user is not actively looking to buy something, the goal of an online ad is to generate intent. The intent generation market is still fairly fragmented and will grow rapidly over the next few years as brand advertising increasingly moves online. P&G – which alone spends almost $4B/year on brand advertising – needs to convince the next generation of consumers that Crest is better than Colgate. This is why Google paid such a premium for Doubleclick, Yahoo for Right Media, and Microsoft for aQuantive (MS’s biggest acquisition ever). In 2003, Google introduced AdSense, a program to syndicate their intent harvesting text ads beyond Google’s main property Google.com.  The playbook they followed was: use their popular website to build a critical mass of advertisers; then use that critical mass to run an off-property network that offers the highest payouts to publishers. AdSense became so dominant that competitors like Yahoo quit the syndicated ad business altogether. Today, Google has such a powerful position that they don’t disclose percentage revenue splits to publishers and extract the vast majority of the profits. It is widely believed that Facebook will soon follow the AdSense playbook by introducing an off-property ad network. They’ll try to use their strong base of advertisers to dominate intent generating ads the way AdSense dominated intent harvesting ads. But to win the intent generation ad battle, data is as important as a critical mass of advertisers. For intent harvesting, users simply type what they are looking for into a search box. For intent generating ads, you need to use data to make inferences about what might influence the user. This is what the introduction of the Facebook Like button is all about.  Intent generating ads – which mostly means displays ads – have notoriously low click through rates (well below 1%). Attempts to improve these numbers through demographics have basically failed. Many startups are having success using social data to target ads today. But the holy grail for targeting intent generating ads is taste data – which basically means what the user likes. Knowing, for example, that a user liked Avatar is an incredibly useful datapoint for targeting an Avatar 2 ad. Publishers who adopt Facebook’s Like feature may get more traffic and perhaps a better user experience as a result.  But they should hope the intent generation ad market doesn’t end up like the intent harvesting ad market – with one dominant player commanding the lion’s share of the profits. * Most text ads are about intent harvesting and most display ads are about intent generation, but they are not coreferential distinctions. For example, with techniques like “search retargeting” (you do a Google search for washing machines and the later on another site see a display ad for washing machines), sometimes intent harvesting is delivered through display ads.
• Facebook, Zynga, and buyer-supplier hold up 8 May, 2010, 7:55 am
  The brewing fight between Facebook and Zynga is what is known in economic strategy circles as “buyer-supplier hold up.” The classic framework for analyzing a firm’s strategic position is Michael Porter’s Five Forces. In Porter’s framework, Zynga’s strategic weakness is extreme supplier concentration – they get almost all their traffic from Facebook. It is in Facebook’s economic interest to extract most of Zynga’s profits, leaving them just enough to keep investing in games and advertising. Last year’s reduced notification change seemed like one move in this direction as it forced game makers to buy more ads instead of getting traffic organically. This probably hurt Zynga’s profitability but also helped them fend off less well-capitalized rivals. Facebook could also hold up Zynga by entering the games business itself, but this seemed unlikely since thus far Facebook has kept its features limited to things that are “utility like.” The way Facebook now seems to be holding up Zynga – requiring Zynga to use their payments system –  is particularly clever.  First, payments are still very much a “utility like” feature, and arguably one that benefits the platform, so it doesn’t come across as flagrant hold up. It is also clever because – assuming Facebook has insight into Zynga’s profitability – Facebook can charge whatever percentage gets them an optimal share of Zynga’s profits. The risk for Zynga is obvious — if they don’t diversify their traffic sources very soon, they are left with a choice between losing profits and losing their entire business.  But there is a risk for Facebook as well. If buyers of traffic (e.g. app makers) fear future hold up, they are less likely to make investments in the platform. The biggest mistake platforms make isn’t charging fees (Facebook) or competing with complements (Twitter), it’s being inconsistent.  Apple also charges 30% fees but they’ve been mostly consistent about it. App makers feel comfortable investing in the Apple platform and even having most of their business depend on them in a way they don’t on Facebook or Twitter.
• Old VC firms: get ready to be disrupted 2 May, 2010, 12:14 pm
  If the U.S. economy were a company, the VC industry would be the R&D department. The financing for the VC industry comes from so-called LPs (Limited Partners) – mostly university endowments, pension funds, family funds, and funds-of-funds. These LPs wield tremendous power, yet very few of them understand how startups or venture capital actually works. I was reminded of this recently when I saw this quote from a prominent fund-of-funds, justifying their investment in a 30-year old venture firm: “As the amount of money raised by venture firms shrinks, older firms that were around before the dot-com bubble will benefit,” said Michael Taylor, a managing director at HarbourVest. “These firms have track records, brand names and knowledge about how to avoid making mistakes that younger firms do not necessarily have,” he said. These older firms do often have track records – they’ve survived precisely because at one point they delivered good returns.  But it’s a mistake to assume that — because VC brands and institutional knowledge persist – past returns will predict future returns.  Here’s why. VC brand names do not persist.  From the perspective of VCs and entrepreneurs, VC brands rise and fall very quickly. Given the excess supply of venture dollars, top tier entrepreneurs are frequently selecting their investors, not vice versa.  The VCs most sought after are mostly new firms:  big firms like Andreeson Horowitz, Union Square Ventures, Khosla Ventures, and First Round, and micro-VCs like Floodgate (fka Maples), Betaworks, and Ron Conway. VC firms don’t accrue institutional knowledge. VC returns are driven by partners, not firms. Studies have shown this, as will a quick perusal of the big exits at prominent VC firms. When key partners switch firms or become less active, VC firms retain very little residual value.  Some service firms — for example consulting firms like McKinsey — invest heavily in accruing institutional knowledge by developing proprietary methodologies and employee apprenticeship programs.  VCs develop no real IP and rarely have serious apprenticeship programs. There is an old saying among big company CIOs that “no one gets fired for buying IBM.”  It’s much easier for a fund-of-fund partner to defend investments based on a VC’s track records. It’s a safe but bad strategy. To intelligently invest in VC firms, you need to roll up your sleeves and dive deep into the startup world.  You need to learn about the startups themselves, assess the entrepreneurs, use their products, analyze market dynamics – all things that good VCs and entrepreneurs do. If you want to understand a VCs brand and abilities don’t look at their track record in the 90s – ask today’s entrepreneurs.  The answer will likely surprise you. Unfortunately, very few LPs do this.  As a result, a massive amount of R&D capital is being misallocated.
• The tradeoff between open and closed 25 April, 2010, 12:57 pm
  When having the “open vs closed” debate regarding a technology platform, a number of distinctions need to be made. First, what exactly is meant by “open.” Here’s a great chart from a paper by Harvard professor Tom Eisenmann (et al).: (Eisenmann acknlowledges the iPhone isn’t fully open to the end user – in the US you need to use AT&T, etc.  I would argue the iPhone is semi-open to the app developer and mobile app development was effectively closed prior to the iPhone. But the main point here is that platforms can be open & closed in many different ways, at different levels, etc.) The next important distinction is whose interest you are considering when asking what and when to open or close things.  I think there are at least 3 interesting perspectives: The company: Lots of people have written about this topic (Clay Christensen, Joel Spolsky, more Eisenmann here).   In a nutshell, there are times when a company, acting solely in its self-interest, should close things and other times they should open things.  As a rule of thumb, a company should close their core assets and open/commoditize complementary assets. Google’s search engine is their core asset and therefore Google should want to keep it closed, whereas the operating system is a complement that they should commoditize (my full analysis of what Google should want to own vs commoditize is here). Facebook’s social graph is their core asset so it’s optimal to close it and not interoperate with other graphs, whereas marking up web pages to be more social-network friendly (open graph protocol) is complementary hence optimal for FB to open.  (With respect to social graphs interoperating (e.g. Open Social), it’s generally in the interest of smaller graphs to interoperate and larger ones not to – the same is true of IM networks).  Note that I think there is absolutely nothing wrong with Google and Facebook or any other company keeping closed or trying to open things according to their own best interests. The industry: When I say “what is good for the industry” I mean what ultimately creates the most aggregate industry-wide shareholder value.  I assume (hope?) this also yields the maximum innovation.  As an active tech entrepreneur and investor I think my personal interests and the tech industry’s interests are mostly aligned (hence you could argue I’m talking my book).  Unfortunately it’s much easier to study open vs. closed strategies at the level of the firm than at the level of an industry, because there are far more “split test” cases to study.  What would the world be like if email (SMTP) were controlled by a single company?  I would tend to think a far less innovative and wealthy one. There are a number of multibillion dollar industries built on email: email clients, webmail systems, email marketing, anti-spam, etc.  The downside of openness is that it’s very hard to upgrade SMTP since you need to get so many parties to agree and coordinate.  So, for example, it has taken forever to add basic anti-spam authentication features to SMTP.  Twitter on the other hand can unilaterally add useful new things like their recent annotations feature. Here’s what Professor Eisenmann said when I asked him to summarize the state of economic thinking on the topic: With respect to your question about the impact of open vs closed on the economy, the hard-core economists cited in my book chapter have a lot to say, but it all boils down to “it depends.” Closed platform provides more incentive for innovation because platform owner can collect and redistribute more rent and can ensure that there’s a manageable level of competition in any given application category. Open platform harnesses strong network effects, attracting more application developers, and  thus stimulates lots of competition. There’s some interesting recent work that suggests that markets may evolve in directions that favor the presence of one strong closed player plus one strong open player (consider: Windows + Linux; iPhone + Android). In this scenario, society/economy gets best of both approaches. Society:  I tend to think what is good for the tech industry is generally good for society.  But others certainly have different views.  Advocates of openness are often accused of being socialist hippies.  Maybe some are.  I am not.  I care about the tech industry.  I think it’s reasonable to question whether moves by large industry players are good or bad for the industry.  Unfortunately most of the debate I’ve seen so far seems driven by ideology and name calling.